# Is Democracy in Danger? A Quick Look at the Data

Influential voices in academia and the media contend that democracy is in decline worldwide and threatened in the US. Using a variety of measures, I show that the global proportion of democracies is actually at or near an all-time high; that the current rate of backsliding is not historically unusual; and that this rate is well explained by the economic characteristics of existing democracies. I confirm that breakdowns tend to occur in countries that are poor, have had relatively little democratic experience, and are in economic crisis. Extrapolating from historical data, I show that the estimated hazard of failure in a democracy as developed and seasoned as the US is extremely low—far lower than in any democracy that has ended in the past. Some suggest that undemocratic public attitudes and erosion of elite norms threaten US institutions, but there is little evidence that these factors cause democratic breakdown. While deterioration in the quality of democracy in countries such as Hungary and Poland is itself cause for concern—as is the reversion to authoritarianism in Russia and Turkey—alarm about a global slide into autocracy is inconsistent with current evidence.

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# 1 Introduction

Democracy is widely thought to be in danger—both globally and in the US. Around the world, democratic government is said to be in "recession," "decaying," "in retreat," or "beleaguered" (Diamond 2015, Zakaria 2018, Rachman 2016, Abramowitz and Repucci 2018). According to one former US Secretary of State, fascism poses "a more serious threat now than at any time since the end of World War II" (Albright 2018). The US under President Trump, writes one commentator, is becoming "the kind of authoritarian state that America was actually founded to overthrow" (Sullivan 2018). Another proposes "rules for survival" in an autocracy (Gessen 2017). Allusions to Weimar Germany and Chile under Allende have become common (Cohen 2015, Dorfman 2017).[1]

How serious are the threats that democracy faces today? The natural place to look for guidance on this is to the historical experience of countries around the world. Of course, available data are imperfect and provide only patterns, not predictions. Still, anecdotes and analogies have fueled the current discourse on democracy's fate. It may be worth exploring past experience more systematically.

In this paper, I examine what such data reveal about democratic erosion. I consider first whether the world is in a "democratic recession." I then assess how democracies have ended in the past and what factors predict their demise. This provides one way to evaluate the current hazard for the US. It turns out that for countries with a similar income level and political history, the odds of democratic collapse are extremely low—far lower than much public debate would suggest. Finally, I consider whether undemocratic attitudes of the public and decay of elite norms have caused past democratic failures. Although this seems plausible, the empirical evidence for

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[1] For dissenting views, see Levitsky and Way (2015) and Carothers and Young (2017).

such relationships appears weak. The most systematic study of elite norms I could find shows essentially that, in Latin America, a radicalized military that favors dictatorship may stage a coup to achieve it. What implications this might have for the partisan polarization in Washington today is unclear.

## 2   Democratic recession?

### 2.1   Is the proportion of democracies decreasing?

How to measure the prevalence and quality of democracies? Several databases and indicators have been widely used. First the Polity IV project rates countries annually on their "authority characteristics" on a scale that ranges from -10 ("hereditary monarchy") to +10 ("consolidated democracy"). Countries scoring 6 or higher are classified as democracies. The Polity2 score combines ratings on a number of components, which include the extent of political competition and constraints on the executive. A second database, constructed by Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012, "BMR"), classifies countries as democracies if the head of the executive branch is either directly elected or chosen by a directly elected legislature and the majority of adult males have the right to vote. Third, the NGO Freedom House has since 1972 compiled ratings of "political rights" and "civil liberties" in countries around the world on a scale that ranges from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Based on these, it classifies countries as "free," "partly free," or "not free." Finally, the Varieties of Democracy project recently constructed a database characterizing countries from 1900 to the present on a range of sub-elements of democracy. It also provides composite classifications that distinguish between "electoral democracies," "liberal democracies," "electoral autocracies," and "closed autocracies."

I use these data sources in the following analysis. None is perfect, and some suffer from significant drawbacks and inconsistencies.[2] Still, they constitute the best available data with which to evaluate claims about democracy worldwide, and they tend to correlate reasonably highly.[3] They are also the measures most frequently invoked by those who warn of democratic decline.

Figure 1 plots the most recent data on the proportion of democracies in the world, for each main indicator. All turn out to be at or very close to an all-time high. As of 2016, 59 percent of countries were Polity2 "democracies," up from 57 percent in 2010 and 50 percent in 2000. All four measures are within 4 percent of their all-time peak.

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[2] The Freedom House scores contain various anomalies. For instance, in 1972-4, amid the Watergate scandal, Freedom House continued to assign the US a perfect score on political rights. Bush (2017, p.722) shows that Freedom House consistently rates US allies higher than does Polity. Polity has its own issues. For 2016, the team lowered the US's Polity2 score from a perfect 10 to 8. The Polity notes explain that: "Political discourse in the United States had become increasing partisan during the administration of President Barack Obama. During the campaign for the November 2016 presidential elections, Donald Trump used combative rhetoric to excite 'populist' support and seize the Republican Party nomination. His surprise victory in Electoral College votes polarized political competition into 'anti-establishment' and 'anti-Trump' factions." It is not clear what in this description represents an erosion of democracy: partisan discourse, combative rhetoric, and surprise victories that divide the winner's supporters and opponents are everyday occurrences in democracies (and were common in the US before 2016). More specifically, Polity downgraded the US "political participation" score from "competitive" to "factional." A "factional" polity is defined as one in which "parochial or ethnic-based political factions… regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas." The "parochial or ethnic-based political factions" presumably refer to the Democratic and Republican parties. If so, it is hard to understand what change in the ethnic or parochial bases of the parties in 2016 justifies the downgrade. Exit polls suggest a slightly *weaker* correlation between race and the presidential vote in 2016 than in 2012. African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans voted at higher rates for Obama in 2012 than for Clinton in 2016, and a higher proportion of white voters chose Romney than chose Trump (59 to 57 percent). In terms of party identification, 92 percent of Democrats voted for Obama in 2012 and 93 percent of Republicans for Romney; the corresponding figures for Clinton and Trump in 2016 were 89 and 88 percent (see https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/groups-voted-2016/ and https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/how-groups-voted-2012/). Thus, coding the US as "factionalized" in 2016 but "competitive" in 2012 appears in error.

[3] Among available country years, the Polity2 and Boix, Miller, Rosato criteria agree on 94 percent of cases. Polity2 correlates with Freedom House's political rights index at $r = .89$, and with VDEM's electoral democracy index at $r = .87$ and its liberal democracy index at $r = .84$.

# Figure 1: Proportion of democracies among world states, various definitions

### Polity 'democracies'
### (Polity2 >= 6)

### Boix, Miller, Rosato 'democracies'

### Freedom House 'free' countries

### VDEM democracies
### electoral or liberal

Figure 2: Proportion of democracies among world states, quality indicators



VDEM electoral democracies

VDEM liberal democracies

Polity 'consolidated democracies'
(Polity2 = 10)

Freedom House top scoring countries

Figure 2, using the same data sources, shows more refined indicators of democratic quality. The proportions of VDEM "electoral" and "liberal" democracies also turn out to be near their all-time peaks. The proportion of countries earning the top Polity2 score of 10 was higher in the late 1950s, before decolonization, but not because the number of top-scoring democracies was lower—the number was actually 50 percent *higher* in 2016 than in 1960—but because decolonization greatly increased the number of independent states. The percentage of countries Freedom House gave perfect political rights scores did fall from 33 percent in 2001 to 28 percent today. Although this is a noticeable decline, it returns the indicator to a level first reached in the mid-1990s, a time when most commentators—far from lamenting a crisis of democracy—were celebrating its global triumph. While most indicators suggest a slowing or halt in the spread of democracy, there has been no significant retrenchment so far. This contrasts with the periods after the first two waves of democratization peaked, during which the number of democracies fell.

While the net proportion of democracies in the world is holding steady, it could still be that existing democracies are failing at higher rates than in the past. Figure 3 shows the proportion of existing democracies that have broken down each year, falling below the relevant definitional threshold. Since the annual data are volatile, I also show the centered 5-year moving average. While some (in particular, the VDEM indicators) trend up slightly in recent years, others slope down. The general impression is of no major change.

# Figure 3: Rates of breakdown of democracies, various definitions

## 2.2 Is the quality of existing democracies declining?

What about the rates of decline in *quality* among existing democracies? Figure 3 shows only the rate of deteriorations large enough to change a "democracy" into a "non-democracy." But some deteriorations are more subtle. Figure 4 shows the proportion of Polity "democracies" (i.e., states with Polity2 ≥ 6) whose Polity2 scores decreased each year, as well as the proportion among states Freedom House had judged to be "free" that experienced declines in political rights or civil liberties. Again, I include a centered 5-year moving average to highlight the trend.

As the graphs show, the proportion of Polity "democracies" that worsened in recent years has been low relative to experience since the 1960s. The rates of Freedom House "free" countries deteriorating on political rights and civil liberties ticked up recently. But they only returned to levels experienced in the late 1990s, far below the peaks reached in the 1970s and 1980s. As with the total proportion of democracies worldwide, this picture could change. But at present it is comparable to that in the mid-1990s, a time of widespread confidence in the extent and future of democracy.

Figure 4: Rates of erosion in quality of democracies, various definitions

If the rate at which individual democracies are deteriorating is not particularly high, why do many observers have a different impression? One possibility is that certain well-known recent cases of deterioration (e.g., Hungary 2014, the US 2017) are more salient than recent cases of improvement (e.g. Mongolia 2012, Tunisia 2014). Since 1999, the proportion of democracies in Africa has more than doubled according to Polity.

Another possibility is that observers confuse lower average quality for an absolute decline. With the sharp increase in the number of democracies since 1990, the average quality has fallen. Among the 55 Polity2 democracies in 1990, 27—or 49 percent—had perfect scores of 10. In 2016, 33 of the 97 Polity2 democracies—or 34 percent—had perfect scores. While both the number of democracies and the number with perfect scores increased, average quality declined.

At the same time, authoritarian states have in recent decades been adopting a less violent and ideological model, imitating democracy (Guriev and Treisman 2018). Some of the states that "transitioned" in the third wave and later "reverted" may have been merely mimicking democracy all along. Such cases may add to the impression that democratic quality is declining, although they are better understood as showing a moderation in the methods of the typical dictatorship.

## 3   How do democracies end?

Democracies turn into autocracies in several ways. One distinction concerns who acquires authoritarian power—incumbent leaders of the expiring democracy or outsiders (Maeda 2010, Svolik 2015). If outsiders take over, a second distinction concerns how they do so—by military coup, civil war, or foreign invasion. If insiders undermine democracy, they may do so rapidly—

in a "democratic breakdown" or "*autogolpe*"—or gradually, by means of "democratic erosion," "backsliding," or "retrogression" (Schedler 1998, Huq and Ginzburg 2018, Waldner and Lust 2018). Of course, these processes may overlap and interact—a coup may occur after democratic erosion has weakened the polity's defenses, or, conversely, the military may step in ostensibly to protect democracy against an abusive incumbent. Thus, some classifications are debatable.

Examining all 195 cases in which a "democratic" (Polity, BMR) or "free" state (FH) changed to a non-democracy or a "partly free" or "not free" state, I determined the manner of transition for each.[4] Following Svolik (2015, p.730), I code an authoritarian reversal as a *coup* "when the armed or security forces participated in the removal of a democratically elected government by employing or threatening violence." I record an *incumbent transformation* when "a democratically elected incumbent undermined key tenets of democracy, most often by abolishing of manipulating elections" (Ibid.). I focused on the first change in a given year from democracy to non-democracy, consulting the published notes of the regime coders where possible. For instance, if an incumbent president dissolved parliament, abrogated the constitution, and suspended supreme court justices, thus provoking a military coup to oust him (as in Panama in 1951), I classified this as an incumbent transformation rather than a coup.

Table 1: Manner of democratic breakdown, percentages

|  | External | | | Incumbent transformation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Coup | Civil War | Invasion |  |
| Polity | 44 |  | 1 | 54 |
| BMR | 62 | 3 | 1 | 34 |
| Freedom House | 24 | 1 |  | 75 |

**Sources:** see Table A2.
**Note:** case of France 1958 excluded.

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[4] I drew heavily on Polity's "Polity I Country Notes," which explain its original coding decisions, and Svolik's (2015) and Powell and Thyne's (2011) data on coups. The cases and sources are listed in appendix Table A2.

Table 1 shows the results. Regardless which indicator is used, very few cases occurred due to civil wars or invasion.[5] However, the balance between military coups and internal transformation depends on the indicator and period covered (from the early 1800s for Polity and BMR, from 1972 for Freedom House). Figure 5 offers insight into the change over time. All indicators concur that the frequency of democratic breakdowns by means of coups has declined, ending up around or below the frequency of breakdowns accomplished by regime insiders. Thus, it is true, as some have noted, that democracies today are more likely to be undermined by insiders than overthrown by outsiders (at least using the Polity and FH data; rates are about equal under the BMR definition). But this is because of a sharp decrease in coups, not a particularly high rate of endogenous breakdowns.

Figure 5: How democracies end



Note: centered 5-year moving averages

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[5] Breakdowns in civil war occurred in Lebanon 1976, Guinea-Bissau 1998, and the Solomon Islands 2000; the case of breakdown due to invasion was France 1940. Polity2 codes France 1958 as a democratic breakdown, but de Gaulle's assumption of power fits none of the categories, so I exclude it here.

## 4 Correlates of democratic breakdown

A small but quite consistent literature suggests that certain factors render democracies more or less likely to fail. A first influence is the level of economic development (Przeworski et al. 2000, Boix and Stokes 2003, Boix 2011, Aléman and Yang 2011, Erdmann 2011). This could operate by several mechanisms. A more educated, globally connected, socially skilled, and technologically sophisticated population will be better able to monitor and discipline incumbents. Modernization may increase the demand for political participation, making it harder for leaders to limit popular involvement (Inglehart and Welzel 2009). Finally, if economic modernization reduces income inequality, this might moderate distributional conflicts that could otherwise undermine institutions (Lipset 1959, Boix 2003). Second, economic crisis may destabilize democracies, leading either to tolerance for emergency measures or social conflicts that degrade the political process (Przeworski et al. 2000, Svolik 2008). The wave of democratic failures in the 1930s is usually blamed on the Great Depression. Third, the availability of mineral rents may reduce the need for rulers to bargain with their citizens and provide greater resources for either authoritarian co-optation or repression (Ross 2012).

Democracies differ in their institutional details, and some have argued that presidential systems give the executive greater leeway than parliamentary systems to consolidate power and erode checks and balances (Przeworski et al. 2000, Maeda 2010). Fifth, democracies may grow more stable over time. Svolik (2015) shows that their survival odds increase dramatically after about 20 years. International influences may also matter: democracies surrounded by others may be more resilient than those encircled by dictatorships. A history of past transitions from democracy to autocracy may make additional breakdowns more likely (Przeworski et al. 2000). Finally, the attractiveness of democracy in a given era may depend on the perceived relative

performance of democracies and authoritarian states. In periods when democracies have high

economic growth on average, they may prove more resilient than when autocracy is seen as the

economically more effective regime type (Miller 2016).

The empirical literature has used various types of survival model to explore such

relationships. I ran survival models using a Weibull distribution, which makes possible the

simulation of baseline hazard rates. I include variables to capture each of the arguments

mentioned. Democratic failure is defined as transition from "democracy" to "non-democracy"

(or "free" to "partly free" or "not free" status), under the relevant definition. Table 2 presents the

results. Data for oil income are only available between 1932 and 2014, so I show models with

and without this variable in, respectively, even and odd columns. Since falling below a certain

threshold is easier if a country starts closer to it, I control for the country's lagged Polity2 score

and Freedom House political rights score in models 1-2 and 5-6 respectively (in the other

models, all countries included start with the same rating—VDEM = democracy, BMR

democracy = 1). The coefficients on lagged Polity2 are as expected and significant.[6] The table

shows exponentiated coefficients, which can be interpreted in terms of hazard rates (a number

below one suggests the variable reduces the hazard, a number above one suggests it increases it).

As the table shows, economic characteristics are important. Richer democracies are much

less likely to break down, and a high growth rate also connotes lower risk. Consistent with the

"oil curse" literature, democracies earning major income from oil and gas production are more

fragile (although significant at only $p < .06$ for  Polity). A longer past experience of democracy

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[6] The FH coefficients are also as expected but not statistically significant. (Since lower FH scores indicate greater freedom, coefficients above one imply that countries initially more free are less likely to become unfree.)

appears to enhance resilience, and past cases of democratic breakdown to erode it (not always

significant). The effects of other factors are less consistent.

Table 2:  Explaining democratic breakdowns

| *Democracy measure* | (1)<br>Polity2 > 6 | (2)<br>Polity2 > 6 | (3)<br>BMR | (4)<br>BMR | (5)<br>FH free | (6)<br>FH free | (7)<br>VDEM | (8)<br>VDEM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ln GDP per capita | 0.49** | 0.49** | 0.48** | 0.41** | 0.44** | 0.39** | 0.57** | 0.50** |
|  | (0.083) | (0.089) | (0.087) | (0.088) | (0.076) | (0.070) | (0.081) | (0.084) |
| Growth rate | 0.93** | 0.92** | 0.93** | 0.92** | 0.90** | 0.89** | 0.94* | 0.94 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.023) | (0.0077) | (0.010) | (0.020) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.033) |
| Ln oil and gas<br>income |  | 1.13 |  | 1.18* |  | 1.18* |  | 1.14* |
|  |  | (0.075) |  | (0.080) |  | (0.081) |  | (0.077) |
| Ln total previous<br>years democratic | 0.059* | 0.015** | 0.20** | 0.25* | 0.63** | 0.62** | 0.18* | 0.17 |
|  | (0.066) | (0.023) | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.098) | (0.10) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Past democratic<br>breakdowns | 5.01** | 6.40** | 2.99** | 2.60** | 1.50 | 1.37 | 2.09* | 1.97 |
|  | (2.05) | (3.01) | (0.81) | (0.72) | (0.46) | (0.45) | (0.67) | (0.71) |
| Average dem. level<br>of contiguous states | 0.93* | 0.93 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 1.07 | 1.09 | 0.29* | 0.35 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.22) |
| Presidential<br>system | 1.22 | 0.85 | 1.64 | 1.27 | 1.19 | 1.10 | 0.92 | 0.73 |
|  | (0.34) | (0.26) | (0.49) | (0.46) | (0.43) | (0.39) | (0.29) | (0.24) |
| Post Cold War<br>(after 1989) | 0.71 | 0.57 | 0.40** | 0.39** | 0.94 | 1.17 | 1.72 | 1.44 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.32) | (0.47) | (0.56) | (0.57) |
| Difference in avge. growth,<br>10 years, dems – non-dems | 0.92 | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.86 | 1.21 | 1.29 | 0.73* | 0.71 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.21) | (0.23) | (0.12) | (0.14) |
| Lagged Polity2 | 0.91* | 0.89* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lagged FH political<br>rights |  |  |  |  | 1.10 | 1.09 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.15) | (0.16) |  |  |
| N | 3609 | 2713 | 3751 | 2885 | 1852 | 1738 | 3075 | 2489 |
| Log likelihood | -127.3 | -93.7 | -136.3 | -99.5 | -96.7 | -88.7 | -120.3 | -97.7 |
| Chi squared | 75.5 | 62.4 | 128.8 | 117.7 | 117.0 | 95.2 | 53.1 | 51.4 |
| p | 1.3e-12 | 1.2e-09 | 4.9e-24 | 3.9e-21 | 5.6e-21 | 4.9e-16 | 1.0e-08 | 5.9e-08 |

**Sources**: see Table A1.
**Notes**: Survival model with Weibull distribution; exponentiated coefficients; robust standard errors, clustered by democratic episode, in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Ln total years democratic: in models 5 and 6, using the VDEM measure of democracy since many countries had already been democratic for many years when the FH data begin in 1972.

Table 3 disaggregates by the mode of transition—antidemocratic coup or internal

transformation. Economic development seems to protect against both types of breakdown (cf.

Svolik 2015). Growth probably does so as well—and hydrocarbon income apparently increases

both dangers—but the first is more significant vis-à-vis coups and the second vis-à-vis internal

degeneration. Democratic experience and the absence of past breakdowns connote greater

resilience, although significance varies across models. Other effects do not appear robust.

Table 3:  Distinguishing modes of democratic breakdown

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Democracy measure* | Polity2 > 6 | Polity2 > 6 | BMR | BMR | FH free | FH free |
| *Mode of transition* | coup | internal | coup | internal | coup | internal |
| Ln GDP per capita | 0.38** | 0.44** | 0.45** | 0.14** | 0.34** | 0.41** |
| | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.062) | (0.13) | (0.10) |
| Growth rate | 0.90** | 0.94 | 0.93** | 0.94 | 0.86** | 0.90* |
| | (0.028) | (0.03) | (0.016) | (0.067) | (0.038) | (0.040) |
| Ln oil and gas | 1.28** | 1.24** | 1.09 | 1.81** | 1.10 | 1.21* |
| Income | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.092) | (0.21) | (0.14) | (0.10) |
| Ln total years | 0.02* | 0.02 | 0.23* | 0.20 | 0.65 | 0.58** |
| democratic | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.14) | (0.42) | (0.34) | (0.099) |
| Past democratic | 7.60** | 5.70** | 3.50** | 1.23 | 1.93 | 1.26 |
| breakdowns | (5.96) | (3.80) | (1.10) | (0.84) | (1.22) | (0.51) |
| Average dem. level | 0.80** | 1.01 | 0.22* | 6.86 | 1.27 | 1.04 |
| of contiguous states | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.15) | (6.93) | (0.25) | (0.15) |
| Presidential | 0.95 | 1.15 | 1.47 | 0.68 | 0.64 | 1.27 |
| System | (0.51) | (0.36) | (0.66) | (0.49) | (0.74) | (0.54) |
| Post Cold War | 0.87 | 1.03 | 0.18** | 5.18 | 0.38 | 1.83 |
| (after 1989) | (0.51) | (0.44) | (0.089) | (6.33) | (0.28) | (0.87) |
| Difference in avge. growth, | 0.71 | 1.33 | 0.71 | 1.15 | 1.08 | 1.33 |
| 10 years, dems – non-dems | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.18) | (0.42) | (0.44) | (0.27) |
| Lagged Polity2 | 0.96 | 0.89* | | | | |
| | (0.09) | (0.05) | | | | |
| Lagged FH political | | | | | 1.11 | 1.06 |
| rights | | | | | (0.34) | (0.17) |
| *N* | 2713 | 2407 | 2885 | 2885 | 1738 | 1738 |
| Log likelihood | -48.7 | -92.9 | -80.0 | -30.2 | -31.2 | -78.5 |
| Chi squared | 82.1 | 39.9 | 88.5 | 70.8 | 106.5 | 64.2 |
| P | 2.0e-13 | 0.000018 | 3.2e-15 | 1.1e-11 | 2.7e-18 | 5.9e-10 |

**Sources**: see Table A1.
**Notes**: Survival model with Weibull distribution; exponentiated coefficients; robust standard errors, clustered by democratic episode, in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Ln total years democratic: in models 5 and 6, using the VDEM measure of democracy since many countries had already been democratic for many years when the FH data begin in 1972.

In Table A3, I explore mechanisms by which economic development might enhance democratic resilience. First, I include a measure of the country's Gini coefficient and its Gini coefficient squared to check for linear and non-linear effects of inequality. The estimates are almost always insignificant, and very small—suggesting, if anything, that democracies are more secure when inequality is *higher*.[7] Second, I include a measure of the education level—the average number of years of schooling among those aged over 15. More education correlates with a lower breakdown risk, although the estimates are not statistically significant. Including education also reduces the estimated impact and significance of income, consistent with the possibility that it is one mechanism by which development enhances democratic stability.

The analysis allows us to explore how high the hazard is that a country like the US will become undemocratic. Using the models in Tables 1 and 2, we can predict the hazard rate for the US in all years for which data exist. Of course, these models may leave out important, hard-to-measure variables, but they provide a baseline to calibrate expectations.

Figure 6 shows that, although hazard rates were higher in the 19th Century and shot up during the Great Depression of the 1930s, they have been extremely low in recent decades. The US's high income and long prior experience of democracy appear to provide a strong protective effect.[8] Using the latest years for which data are available, the estimated probability that a country with the US's characteristics would fall below the Polity "democracy" threshold is .0002; for BMR democracy, .0005; for Freedom House's "free" status, .0031; and for VDEM democracy, .0017. In each case, a change to authoritarianism is extremely improbable. For

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[7] I show results using Gini coefficients for pre-tax incomes, from the SWIID database (V.6.2); using data for post-tax incomes produces generally similar results.

[8] And this would also be true if, as some have argued, the US only became fully democratic in the 1970s, after the successes of the civil rights movement (Mickey, Levitsky, and Way 2014).

comparison, the predicted hazard that Germany as of 1932 would become undemocratic was 116 times higher (using the Polity criterion), and that for Chile in 1972 was 317 times higher. No democracy has ever failed with a hazard as low as that of the US in 2016. The closest case is that of France in 1958, when Polity—somewhat controversially—codes de Gaulle's ascent to the presidency as a breakdown of democracy. France's estimated hazard that year was .0011, five times that of the US in 2016.[9]

Another way to put this is to estimate how severe an economic crisis would have to be to raise the odds of democratic breakdown for the US today to the level of, say, Chile in 1972. The answer is that it would take a growth rate of about -76 percent using the Polity criterion (or -63 percent using the BMR definition)—in other words, a contraction greater than the Great Depression. And even an economic disaster of this magnitude would probably *not* lead to dictatorship in the US: the estimated probability (of a Polity2 breakdown) for Chile in 1972 was only .07—that is, less than one in ten. It would take sustained contractions on this scale for a number of years to render authoritarian reversion more likely than not. Of course, one should not take such estimates too literally, but they give a sense of just how great are the differences implicitly disregarded when one compares the US under President Trump to most previous settings of democratic failure.

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[9] Figure A1 in the appendix shows the hazard predicted using the model from Table 2, column 1, with the non-significant variables (i.e. presidentialism, post-Cold War, and difference in growth rates between democracies and non-democracies) excluded. The results are similar. The estimated hazard for the US in 2016 was .0003. The estimate for Germany in 1932 was 78 times higher, and that for Chile in 1972 was 203 times higher.

Figure 6: Estimated hazard of US democratic breakdown

The models in Table 2 also allow us to gauge how surprised we should be by the rate of democratic reversals in recent years. As noted, the retrenchments after the first two democratization waves were far more pronounced than anything visible today (see Figure 1). At the height of a democratization wave, some unlikely contenders for free government get swept up in the momentum. Such crossovers will have lower income, more volatile economies, and—almost by definition—less democratic experience than is conducive to stable democracy. We should expect some backsliding for this reason alone. Median income among Polity "democracies" peaked in 1978 around $19,000 (at 2014 prices). It fell to under $10,000 in 1994, and was still only around $15,300 in 2015 (using the Maddison data). Median growth rates also fell in the early 1990s.

Given the income and growth distributions and other characteristics of recently existing democracies, how much reversion should we expect? In fact, about as much as we have seen. I estimated the model in Table 2, column 1, dropping the variables that had proved insignificant (i.e. post-Cold War, average growth ratio for democracies and non-democracies, and presidential system) for all years up to 1999, used this to predict the hazard rates for all democracies in subsequent years, and then summed the individual democracy-year hazards to get the predicted total number of breakdowns. The model estimates aggregate to a prediction of 26 breakdowns between 2000 and 2016; the actual number was 22. Running a model containing just income and growth, the predicted total number of breakdowns is 21, almost exactly the actual number. In short, the rate of democratic retrenchment in recent years does not constitute a puzzle: it is very close to what one would predict based on the changing economic profiles of world democracies.

# 5 Attitudes and norms

Since at least the publication of *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963), scholars have argued that stable democracy requires an underpinning of supportive attitudes and norms. Some claim that attitudes of the *public* matter. Others direct attention to values and norms of key political actors. Recently, Foa and Mounk (2017) have argued that declining support for liberal democracy among populations of advanced democracies—especially their younger cohorts— threatens the stability of those states. Others have suggested that the greater skepticism of younger cohorts is a life cycle effect rather than a lasting trend (Norris 2017). Among those emphasizing the norms of elites are Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) and Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), who argue that an erosion of mutual toleration and forbearance among US politicians constitutes a danger to American democracy.

Anti-democratic attitudes and the erosion of norms of toleration and restraint would seem undesirable in themselves. But how strong is the empirical evidence that such factors cause democracies to break down? And how powerful are such factors relative to others—such as high levels of economic development and long democratic experience—which appear to strengthen such orders?

Taking first the role of public attitudes, there are obvious difficulties in determining how these affect democratic survival. First, causation may run in the opposite direction: democracies that survive are likely to cultivate—deliberately or not—pro-democratic values. Second, cross-national survey data on attitudes towards democracy are quite limited—especially data that extend into past eras when breakdowns were more frequent. A third problem is that raters of regimes sometimes include public attitudes towards democracy—or associated ones, such as

confidence in government institutions—as inputs in their ratings. In such cases, public attitudes cannot reasonably be used to explain democracy ratings.[10]

Those who have argued that declining support for democracy raises the risk of reversion draw heavily on the World Values Survey (WVS) (Foa and Mounk 2017). But do the WVS attitudinal data predict cases of democratic failure? To check this, I examined whether average responses on three relevant questions (emphasized by Foa and Mounk, among others) could predict which democracies broke down in the following five years. Among WVS democracies with data, there were nine such breakdowns (four under just the Polity2 definition, two under just the BMR definition, and three that fit both). I compared attitudes in these nine country surveys to average attitudes in democracies that did *not* break down in the five post-survey years. The three questions had a common preamble: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?" The three options were: (1) "Having a democratic political system," (2) "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections," and (3) "Having the army rule." I calculated the proportion of respondents saying "very good" or "fairly good" for each option.

Table 4 shows the results. First, there is no clear difference between levels of support for a "democratic political system" in the democracies that subsequently broke down and those that did not. Using either the Polity or BMR data, support is around 80 percent in both types, and the difference is not significant. Moreover, in the democracies that failed—but not those that survived—support for democracy had *risen* by several percentage points between the last two

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[10] For instance, the Economist Intelligence Unit includes "political culture" as one of the five elements used for classifying regimes, which makes it impossible to use this rating to assess the relationship between political culture and democratic survival (see http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index).

WVS waves. Based on this limited evidence, neither the level nor the recent change in public approval of democracy seems a good predictor of democratic breakdown.

Table 4: Attitudes about types of government, World Values Survey

| | *Mean percentage saying "very good" or "fairly good" to have:* | | | | | | *Type of democratic breakdown* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Democratic political system | | Strong leader | | Army rule | | |
| *Level in preceding survey in democracies that…* | | | | | | | |
| | Polity | BMR | Polity | BMR | Polity | BMR | |
| did not break down | 82.7 | 83.0 | 35.0 | 36.1 | 17.1 | 17.3 | |
| broke down | 83.0 | 78.3 | 46.2 | 38.6 | 26.7 | 26.5 | |
| $H_0$: Difference = 0 | p = .91 | p = .23 | p = .08 | p = .74 | p = .13 | p = .23 | |
| *Change between preceding waves in democracies that…* | | | | | | | |
| | Polity | BMR | Polity | BMR | Polity | BMR | |
| did not break down | -0.2 | 0.0 | +3.5 | +3.9 | +1.2 | +1.0 | |
| broke down | +4.5 | +3.3 | -4.8 | -5.8 | -5.6 | -3.4 | |
| $H_0$: Difference = 0 | p = .13 | p = .42 | p = .11 | p = .15 | p = .22 | p = .55 | |
| *WVS survey: levels* | | | | | | | |
| Venezuela 2000 | 92.2 | | 45.2 | | 21.8 | | 2005 (BMR) |
| Russia 1995 | 45.0 | | 42.6 | | 17.5 | | 1999 (BMR) |
| Russia 2006 | 65.8 | | 46.6 | | 13.2 | | 2007 (Polity) |
| Ukraine 2011 | 85.3 | | 71.3 | | 12.7 | | 2014 (Polity) |
| Turkey 2011 | 83.2 | | 49.8 | | 27.2 | | 2014 (Polity) |
| Pakistan 1997 | 67.9 | | 63.7 | | 41.5 | | 1999 (Polity, BMR) |
| Bangladesh 2002 | 94.6 | | 10.8 | | 17.2 | | 2007 (Polity, BMR) |
| Thailand 2013 | 91.8 | | 30.7 | | 34.6 | | 2014 (Polity, BMR) |
| Malaysia 2012 | 92.8 | | 50.4 | | 40.6 | | 2014 (Polity) |
| *Memo: USA 2011* | *79.7* | | *34.2* | | *16.9* | | |

**Source**: World Values Survey.

Responses on rule by a "strong leader" and "the army" were somewhat more consistent with the claim that antidemocratic public attitudes weaken democracies. Using the Polity data, support for a "strong leader" was higher on average in the democracies that reverted (46.2 compared to 35.0 percent, difference significant at p = .08), although there was no significant difference using the BMR data. Enthusiasm for army rule appears primarily in certain Asian democracies—Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia—and the difference in means on this between surviving and failing democracies was not statistically significant. And, contrary to the

argument, support for a strong leader and army rule had been falling in the democracies that broke down.

On closer inspection, the apparent stronger appeal of authoritarianism in the democracies that later failed turns out to be something more puzzling. Among those respondents in democracies that would fail who favored both "strong leaders" and army rule, 85 percent also approved of democracy! In fact, support for democracy was higher among endorsers of "strong leaders" and army rule than among others. What this suggests is less a penchant for dictatorship than simple confusion—or perhaps a preference for positive answers.

In sum, the World Values Survey does provide some evidence consistent with a role for public attitudes, but it is weak (even ignoring the difficulty of imputing causality). Support for democracy was very high—about 80 percent—in both democracies that failed and those that survived. Somewhat larger minorities in the failing democracies liked the idea of a strong, unencumbered leader or—in some Asian countries—that of army rule. But these same respondents *also* expressed support for democracy, which makes it hard to understand *what* they really thought.

Do the latest WVS results for the US provide reason to worry? Support for democracy among US respondents was also around 80 percent. Approval of rule by the army or by a "strong leader" was slightly *below* the average for democracies that survived. At present there seems little cause for alarm.[11]

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[11] Foa and Mounk (2017) expressed concern at the low and falling level of support for democracy documented among the *young*. But this may reflect ignorance as much as authoritarianism (or perhaps faulty sampling in the 2011 WVS US poll). Some WVS questions ask respondents to rate how essential various ideas are to the definition of democracy. Those who rate at 6 or higher on a 10-point scale "people choose their leaders in free elections" and "civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression" might be considered to understand correctly what democracy is. Among US 16- to 29-year-olds who correctly identified these two elements of democracy in 2011, 84 percent thought that democracy was a very or fairly good system of government. Among those who did not recognize these as defining elements of democracy, support for it was only 56 percent. Worldwide, the respective levels of support for democracy in 2010-14 among 16- to 29-year-olds who did and did not understand the concept's

Diamond (1999, Chapter 5) also argues that democracy requires a high level of mass support. However, the opinion data he cites do not, on closer examination, make a strong case. For instance, he reproduces results from a 1996 Latinobarometer survey on levels of support for democracy in 17 Latin American countries plus Spain. The percentages agreeing that "democracy is preferable to any other kind of government" ranged from 42 percent in Honduras to 81 percent in Spain. The percentage saying they were ready "to defend democracy if it was under threat" varied between 53 percent in Chile and 85 percent in Costa Rica. In the decade following the survey, three countries—Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia—lost ground on both the Polity2 and the FH political rights measures, while all the others remained the same or improved. Did the countries where the regime became less democratic have lower levels of mass support for democracy? Table 5 shows the answer. In fact, while the proportion that thought democracy preferable to other forms of government was close to the same for the two sets of countries (difference not statistically significant), self-reported willingness to defend democracy was 8.5 percentage points *higher* in the countries where democracy later deteriorated (significant at p = .07). Once again, mass attitudes do not seem closely related to regime outcomes.

Evidence linking the norms of political elites to regime survival is even scarcer than that on mass attitudes. But one excellent study focused on Latin America is Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013). The authors coded who the key political actors were in different periods in 20 countries and rated each on two scales—one measuring the actors' normative preference for

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meaning were 88 and 74 percent (88 and 72 percent among respondents of all ages). In the WVS, the proportion of US 16- to 29-year-olds who rated these two features as defining elements of democracy fell from 71 percent in 2006 to 56 percent in 2011. Rough calculations suggest that had understanding of the term not fallen, the gap between the young and others in support for democracy would be about 40 percent smaller. This cannot explain why support for "rule by the army" also increased among US respondents. However, it is worth noting that support for democracy was *higher* among 16- to 29-year-old US respondents who favored rule by the army than among those who did not (78 vs 70 percent)! This looks more like confusion or not taking the questionnaire seriously than like a genuine authoritarian trend.

democracy, the other on the radicalism of their policy positions. They found that, between 1945

and 2005, lower commitment to democracy among the central actors, and (in some models) the

radicalism of their positions, correlated with democratic breakdowns in the countries studied.

Moreover, within Latin America, they found no relationship between economic development and

democratic survival.

Table 5: Average Support for Democracy in Latin America and Spain

| Average percentage saying: | Countries in which in subsequent decade Polity 2 rating or FH political rights score | |
|---|---|---|
| | ...deteriorated | ... stayed same or improved |
| Democracy preferable to any other kind of government | 59.3 | 62.7 |
| They would defend democracy if under threat | 79.3 | 70.8 |

**Source**: Latinobarometer (reported in Diamond 1999, p.180).

Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán's point is not to derive implications for what might happen

in the US were norms favoring democracy and political cooperation to erode. Their work

provides valuable insights into Latin America. But are there broader implications? To assess that,

it is worth exploring which cases drive their finding. Replicating the main regression using

Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán's data, I find the result depends on Argentina and Uruguay: if they

are excluded, the effect of actors' normative preference for or against democracy becomes

insignificant with a coefficient close to zero (Table A4). Meanwhile, income—previously

insignificant—becomes significant with a negative coefficient, suggesting that—as in the global

models of Tables 2 and 3—higher income protects against democratic breakdown.

Who were the actors in the Argentine and Uruguayan cases, and what norms did they

embrace? It turns out that before each of the democratic breakdowns (1951, 1962, 1966, and

1976 for Argentina; 1973 for Uruguay), one key actor was a military with radical policy

positions and a preference for dictatorship.[12] And in four of the five cases it was a military coup that overthrew democracy. The message seems clear: where top military leaders favor dictatorship and radical policies, democracy may be at risk. Fortunately, that does not describe the kind of norm erosion observed in US politics, where so far Republicans and Democrats have fought each other with filibusters rather than tanks.

In the 1970s, Argentina and Uruguay were exemplars of "bureaucratic authoritarianism," a form of authoritarian regime that survived at moderately high levels of modernization (O'Donnell 1988). Thus, it is not surprising that including them eliminates the association between authoritarianism and low development in Latin America. What is more interesting is that excluding these two countries, there *is* a strong relationship between development and lower democratic breakdown risk among the remaining 18 countries. It seems to be not Latin America that is different but Argentina, Uruguay, and perhaps a few others. Although Argentina and Uruguay were relatively developed in the 1970s, when each last succumbed to authoritarianism, they were much poorer and less consolidated than the US is today. Based on the predictions from Table 2, column 1, Argentina in 1975 was 290 times more likely to succumb to a democratic reversal than the US in 2016, and Uruguay in the early 1970s was 158 times more likely.

A convincing evaluation of the relationship between public attitudes, elite norms, and democratic survival must await further research. In the meanwhile, the limited evidence available suggests caution in applying loose analogies.

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[12] Actors are coded from 0 to 1 on pro-democratic preferences, pro-dictatorship preferences, and radicalism of policy preferences. If we add the scores for pro-dictatorship preferences and radicalism together, subtract the score for pro-democratic preferences, and add 1, we get a measure ranging from 0 to 3 of anti-democratic norms. In each of the 5 Argentine or Uruguyan cases in which breakdown followed, the score for the military was 2.5 or 3.

# 6 Conclusion

Available measures suggest the proportion of democratic countries in the world today is at or near an all-time high. The few indicators that show some backsliding indicate only a return to the level of the 1990s, a time when liberal democracy was widely considered triumphant. The rate of increase has slowed. But this follows the stunning surge of democracy's "third wave." The rate of failures among existing democracies is close to that predicted by their levels of economic development, income growth, and past democratic experience. Moreover, whereas previous waves have been followed within 10-15 years by a significant fall in the proportion of democracies, that has not occurred this time, at least so far. Neither the rate of democratic breakdowns nor that of quality deteriorations in existing democracies is historically high.

Previous literature and the survival models presented here confirm that high economic development, positive economic growth, and extensive democratic experience are associated with much lower odds of democratic breakdown. Indeed, no democracy has ever failed at a per capita income above $22,000 or after surviving for 65 years. Based on such estimated relationships, the hazard of a breakdown in the US today appears extremely low. While some data suggest a weakening of commitment to democracy among parts of the US public—which is worrying in itself—it is hard to find any systematic evidence that low or falling public support for democracy causes democratic breakdowns. As for elite norms, Latin American countries where a radicalized military supported dictatorship have sometimes succumbed to antidemocratic coups. But excluding such extreme cases, the claim that eroding norms cause democracies to fail appears to rest on anecdotal evidence.

Even if it does not constitute a general trend, deterioration in the quality of democracy in countries such as Hungary and Poland is obviously cause for concern, as is the reversion to

authoritarianism in Russia and Turkey. It is certainly possible that a global slide in democracy has begun that will accelerate in coming years. It is also possible that US institutions will prove weaker than expected. Few democracies have been tested by the kind of demographic change forecast for coming decades, as the previously dominant race loses its majority status. Still it is important to distinguish between fears for the future and expectations that are reasonable based on available evidence. The historical record suggests that democracies like the US have inner resources that distinguish them from younger and poorer ones. They are far less vulnerable to destructive demagogues than much current commentary implies.

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# Appendix (for online publication)

Table A1. Data Sources for Tables 2 and 3

| *Variable* | *Definition* | *Source* |
|---|---|---|
| Ln GDP per capita | Using real GDP per capita (rgdpnapc) | Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), "Rebasing 'Maddison': new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development", Maddison Project Working paper 10 |
| Growth rate | Annual growth rate of GDP per capita (using rgdpnapc) | Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), "Rebasing 'Maddison': new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development", Maddison Project Working paper 10 |
| Ln oil and gas income | Natural log of value of oil and gas sales | Ross, Michael L, 2013, "Oil and Gas Data, 1932-2011" https://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/20369, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:5:dc22RlDasveOTAJvwIjBTA== |
| Democratic for more than 20 consecutive years | Using the same democracy definition as the dependent variable (except for Freedom House, for which using VDEM's democracy measure). | Various |
| Past democratic breakdowns | Using the same democracy definition as the dependent variable. | Various |
| Average democracy level of contiguous states | Average Polity2 score of neighbors for Polity2 models; proportion of neighbors that are democracies for BMR models; average political rights score of neighbors for FH. Neighbors are countries with a land or river border. | Polity IV, BMR (Boix, Carles, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. 2013. "A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007." *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (12): 1523-54.), Freedom House. |
| Presidential system | Dummy for presidential system; current year or as of 2000 for years after 2000. | Adam Przeworski et al. 2013. *Political Instituitons and Political Events Database.* |
| Gini pre-tax and post-tax income | Average of 100 imputed values, where data unavailable. | SWIID V6.2. (Solt 2016). |
| Average years schooling, over 15 | Average years of schooling for members of the population aged over 15, interpolated linearly since figures given once per decade. | Morrisson, Christian, and Fabrice Murtin. "The century of education." *Journal of Human Capital* 3.1 (2009): 1-42. |

Table A2. Democratic Breakdowns

| Country | year | Polity2 | BMR | FH | Coup | Internal | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | 1851 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| France | 1852 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes, Svolik (2015) |
| New Zealand | 1876 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Brooking (2004) |
| Colombia | 1886 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Bushnell (1993, pp.142-3) |
| Greece | 1915 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| Cuba | 1916 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Staten (2015, p.59) |
| Italy | 1922 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| Spain | 1923 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Polity I notes |
| Chile | 1925 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Rector (2005, p.132), Svolik (2015). |
| Lithuania | 1926 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Polity I notes |
| Poland | 1926 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Polity I notes |
| Portugal | 1926 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Polity I notes, Svolik (2015) |
| Yugoslavia | 1929 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity 1 notes |
| Argentina | 1931 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Polity I notes, Svolik (2015) |
| Finland | 1931 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| Austria | 1933 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes, Svolik (2015) |
| Germany | 1933 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes, Svolik (2015) |
| Estonia | 1934 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| Latvia | 1934 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| Uruguay | 1934 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Weinstein (1988, p.22), Svolik (2015) |
| Greece | 1936 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes, Svolik (2015) |
| Spain | 1937 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Polity I notes |
| Spain | 1939 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Polity I notes |
| France | 1940 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Polity I notes: Invasion |
| Brazil | 1947 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| Czechoslovakia | 1947 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| Colombia | 1948 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes, Svolik (2015) |
| Greece | 1949 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Polity I notes |
| Panama | 1951 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015). Although President Arias was removed by the National Guard, this was after he had abolished the constitution, dissolved the national assembly, and suspended Supreme Court justices (Coniff 2012, p.194). |
| Cuba | 1953 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Svolik (2015) |
| Guatemala | 1954 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Turkey | 1954 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Pakistan | 1956 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Indonesia | 1957 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| France | 1958 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Myanmar (Burma) | 1958 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Pakistan | 1958 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Sudan | 1958 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Laos | 1959 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Laos | 1960 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Brazil | 1961 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Korea South | 1961 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Argentina | 1962 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Rock (1987, p.342) |
| Myanmar (Burma) | 1962 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Peru | 1962 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Congo Brazzaville | 1963 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Dominican Republic | 1963 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Ecuador | 1963 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Guatemala | 1963 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Honduras | 1963 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Brazil | 1964 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |

| Country | Year | | | | | | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Philippines | 1965 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Argentina | 1966 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Nigeria | 1966 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Uganda | 1966 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Greece | 1967 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Polity I notes, Svolik (2015) |
| Sierra Leone | 1967 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Panama | 1968 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Peru | 1968 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Malaysia | 1969 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Somalia | 1969 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Sudan | 1969 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Lesotho | 1970 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Turkey | 1971 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Uruguay | 1971 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Ghana | 1972 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Honduras | 1972 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Chile | 1973 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Guyana | 1973 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Maldives | 1973 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Uruguay | 1973 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Argentina | 1974 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Bangladesh | 1974 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Cyprus | 1974 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Dominican Republic | 1974 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Guatemala | 1974 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Malaysia | 1974 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| India | 1975 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Lebanon | 1975 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Sri Lanka | 1975 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Argentina | 1976 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| El Salvador | 1976 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Lebanon | 1976 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | civil war: www.nytimes.com/1976/03/19/archives/anarchy-in-lebanon-all-aspects-of-society-disintegrating-as-the.html |
| Thailand | 1976 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Pakistan | 1977 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Seychelles | 1977 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Sri Lanka | 1977 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Mauritius | 1978 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Grenada | 1979 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Bolivia | 1980 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Burkina Faso | 1980 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Suriname | 1980 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Turkey | 1980 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Ghana | 1981 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Gambia | 1982 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Ghana | 1982 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Guatemala | 1982 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Sri Lanka | 1982 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Honduras | 1983 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Malta | 1983 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Nigeria | 1983 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Sri Lanka | 1983 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Vanuatu | 1983 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Nigeria | 1984 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Honduras | 1985 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |

| Country | Year | | | | | | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uganda | 1985 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Fiji | 1987 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Colombia | 1989 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Peru | 1989 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Sudan | 1989 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Suriname | 1989 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Peru | 1990 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Philippines | 1990 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Suriname | 1990 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Antigua | 1991 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Haiti | 1991 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| India | 1991 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Thailand | 1991 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Estonia | 1992 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Latvia | 1992 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Peru | 1992 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Venezuela | 1992 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Bangladesh | 1993 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Brazil | 1993 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Dominican Republic | 1993 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Honduras | 1993 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Nepal | 1993 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Papua New Guinea | 1993 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Ukraine | 1993 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Zambia | 1993 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Belarus | 1994 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Dominican Republic | 1994 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Gambia | 1994 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Mali | 1994 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Armenia | 1995 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Belarus | 1995 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Bolivia | 1995 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Albania | 1996 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Ecuador | 1996 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Niger | 1996 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Slovak Republic | 1996 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Zambia | 1996 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1998 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Forrest (2005, p.256): civil war |
| Haiti | 1999 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Honduras | 1999 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/honduras |
| Malawi | 1999 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Pakistan | 1999 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Russia | 1999 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Venezuela | 1999 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Ecuador | 2000 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/ecuador, Svolik (2015) |
| Fiji | 2000 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Solomon Islands | 2000 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ethnic civil war: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5278c918b.html |
| Argentina | 2001 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Malawi | 2001 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 2001 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Nepal | 2002 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Bolivia | 2003 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Central African Republic | 2003 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Papua New Guinea | 2003 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sri Lanka | 2003 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Mozambique | 2004 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Guyana | 2005 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Philippines | 2005 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Thailand | 2005 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Venezuela | 2005 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Fiji | 2006 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Thailand | 2006 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Venezuela | 2006 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Bangladesh | 2007 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Ecuador | 2007 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Russia | 2007 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011), Svolik (2015) |
| Senegal | 2008 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Honduras | 2009 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Lesotho | 2009 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Madagascar | 2009 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Niger | 2009 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Sri Lanka | 2009 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Mexico | 2010 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Sri Lanka | 2010 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Ukraine | 2010 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2012 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Maldives | 2012 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Mali | 2012 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Indonesia | 2013 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Mali | 2013 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Sierra Leone | 2013 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Bangladesh | 2014 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Malaysia | 2014 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Thailand | 2014 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Turkey | 2014 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Ukraine | 2014 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Burundi | 2015 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Dominican Republic | 2015 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Lesotho | 2015 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
| Montenegro | 2015 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |

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Table A3:  Mechanisms behind economic development effect: inequality and education

| Democracy measure | (1) Polity2 > 6 | (2) Polity2 > 6 | (3) BMR | (4) BMR | (5) FH free | (6) FH free | (7) Polity2 > 6 | (8) BMR | (9) FH free |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ln GDP per gapita | 0.46** | 0.45** | 0.48** | 0.48** | 0.49** | 0.51** | 0.62 | 0.54* | 0.79 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.21) | (0.15) | (0.34) |
| Growth rate | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.89** | 0.89** | 0.88** | 0.88** | 0.93** | 0.93** | 0.95 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.018) | (0.016) | (0.055) |
| Ln total years democratic | 0.0010** | 0.0011** | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.56** | 0.56** | 0.11* | 0.22* | 0.49* |
|  | (0.0024) | (0.0026) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.082) | (0.082) | (0.12) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Past democratic Breakdowns | 12.9** | 12.6** | 3.06** | 3.06** | 1.48 | 1.31 | 4.11** | 3.11** | 1.22 |
|  | (9.09) | (8.53) | (1.30) | (1.29) | (0.44) | (0.44) | (1.77) | (0.94) | (0.59) |
| Average democracy contiguous states | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 1.14 | 1.19 | 0.93 | 0.52 | 1.22 |
|  | (0.046) | (0.045) | (0.30) | (0.30) | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.048) | (0.30) | (0.21) |
| Presidential System | 1.09 | 1.09 | 1.67 | 1.67 | 1.82 | 1.88 | 2.30 | 2.72** | 1.28 |
|  | (0.51) | (0.52) | (0.90) | (0.90) | (0.80) | (0.81) | (1.07) | (1.05) | (0.72) |
| Post Cold War (after 1989) | 0.23* | 0.23* | 0.24** | 0.24** | 1.46 | 1.57 | 0.35 | 0.25** | 0.87 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.61) | (0.65) | (0.20) | (0.12) | (0.48) |
| Gini coefficient (pre-tax) | 0.0058 | 0.000031 | 0.026 | 0.0098 | 0.065 | 5.36e+09 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.017) | (0.00056) | (0.093) | (0.24) | (0.18) | (1.86e+11) |  |  |  |
| Gini coefficient Squared |  | 368.1 |  | 3.00 |  | 4.6e-12 |  |  |  |
|  |  | (7298.0) |  | (78.1) |  | (1.6e-10) |  |  |  |
| Average years Schooling, over 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.89 | 0.86 | 0.93 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.13) | (0.095) | (0.16) |
| Lagged Polity2 | 0.83** | 0.84** |  |  |  |  | 0.89 |  |  |
|  | (0.046) | (0.047) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lagged FH political rights |  |  |  |  | 0.89 | 0.91 |  |  | 1.27 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.16) | (0.16) |  |  | (0.28) |
| N | 2203 | 2203 | 2230 | 2230 | 1640 | 1640 | 2296 | 2509 | 1063 |
| Log likelihood | -51.3 | -51.2 | -55.3 | -55.3 | -70.7 | -70.2 | -65.8 | -84.7 | -52.2 |
| Chi squared | 64.4 | 65.8 | 44.8 | 46.6 | 97.9 | 101.8 | 53.7 | 66.1 | 69.5 |
| P | 1.9e-10 | 2.9e-10 | 4.0e-07 | 4.7e-07 | 4.1e-17 | 2.3e-17 | 2.1e-08 | 3.0e-11 | 1.9e-11 |

**Sources**: see Table A1.

**Notes**: Survival model with Weibull distribution; exponentiated coefficients; robust standard errors, clustered by democratic episode, in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Ln total years democratic: In models 5, 6, and 9: using the VDEM measure of democracy since many countries had already been democratic for many years when the FH data begin in 1972.

Table A4. Normative preferences and democratic breakdown in Latin America

| | (1) Replicating Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, model 4.4.5 | (2) Excluding Argentina and Uruguay |
|---|---|---|
| Normative preferences | -2.70* | 0.090 |
| | (1.10) | (0.94) |
| Radicalism (ruler) | 1.03 | 0.86 |
| | (0.99) | (1.09) |
| Radicalism (opposition) | -0.69 | 0.57 |
| | (0.69) | (0.76) |
| Region, $t-1$ | -4.38* | -1.65 |
| | (1.93) | (2.01) |
| US policy, $t$ | -0.83 | -1.57** |
| | (0.64) | (0.56) |
| Polity outside the region, $t-1$ | -0.43 | -0.60 |
| | (0.25) | (0.32) |
| Per capita GDP, ln, $t-1$ | 0.31 | -2.09* |
| | (0.53) | (1.00) |
| Growth, 10 years | 6.96 | 25.7 |
| | (12.9) | (17.2) |
| Oil and mineral exports | -0.98 | 0.28 |
| | (0.71) | (0.66) |
| Industrial labor, $t-1$ | -0.00051 | -0.00051 |
| | (0.048) | (0.044) |
| Age of the regime | 0.21 | 0.24 |
| | (0.16) | (0.15) |
| Age of the regime squared | -0.0081 | -0.0079 |
| | (0.0087) | (0.0080) |
| Age of the regime cubed | 0.00010 | 0.00010 |
| | (0.00013) | (0.00012) |
| Presidential powers | -0.25** | -0.32** |
| | (0.049) | (0.085) |
| Multipartism, $t$ | 0.45 | 0.58 |
| | (0.64) | (0.80) |
| Semi-democracy, $t-1$ | 2.31** | 1.71* |
| | (0.62) | (0.73) |
| $N$ | 644 | 558 |
| Log likelihood | -70.3 | -56.8 |

**Note**: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.
**Source**: Data from Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013), http://kellogg.nd.edu/democracies-and-dictatorships-latin-america-emergence-survival-and-fall.

Figure A1: Estimated hazard for the US, model excluding insignificant variables



**Note:** presidentialism, post-Cold War, and difference in growth rates between democracies and non-democracies excluded from model in Table 2, column 1.